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CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER THE INTERNAL
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"I like to pay taxes. With them I buy civilization."
-Oliver Wendell Holmes
1
INTRODUCTION
Even if the United States federal income tax system is deemed
to be one of legal compulsion rather than voluntary self-assess-
ment,2 its efficiency and effectiveness still depend upon the
honesty, integrity, and diligence of the taxpayer. 3 Although
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I RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION FOR PROSPERiTY 277 (1947) (quoting Oliver
Wendell Holmes).
2 The exact nature of the American tax system is the subject of much debate. See
e.g., Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 176 (1960) (stating that the income tax
system is "based upon voluntary assessment and payment" by the taxpayer); In re
Publishers Guild, Inc., 219 Ct. Cl. 643, 647 (1979) (reflecting that "ours is not a 'self-
assessment' tax system, but a self-computing, self-determining, or self-reporting
system of taxation" (quoting Farnsworth & Chambers Co. v. Phinney, 178 F. Supp.
330, 333 (S.D. Tex. 1959))); Kenneth L. Harris, On Requiring the Correction of Error
Under the Federal Tax Law, 42 TAX LAW. 515, 515 (1989) ("[Tlhe system is not truly
voluntary because taxpayers are legally required to report their income and may incur
both civil and criminal penalties for failure to do so.");John A. LeDuc, Improving the
Self-Assessment of Federal Income Tax: Recent Legislative Developments, 19 TAX NoTES
1027, 1029 (1983) ("The federal income tax system is voluntary... in the sense that
the assessment and payment of tax is made by the taxpayer in the first instance.").
Some taxpayers have not taken such a narrow view of the term "voluntary." See, e.g.,
United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 955 (7th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (noting that
one taxpayer, a dentist, "decided that income taxes are voluntary and elected not to
contribute").
3 See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973) (stating that the entire tax
system is "largely dependent upon honest self-reporting"); Spies v. United States, 317
U.S. 492, 495 (1943) (stating that the tax "system can function successfully only if
those within and near taxable income keep and render true accounts," and that "[i]n
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Congress originally counted on Americans to "cheerfully" support
the income tax,4 it quickly recognized that honesty and integrity
alone would not insure truthful reporting.5 Yet, despite the various
civil and criminal penalties prescribed by Congress to deter and
punish noncompliance, the "tax gap"-the difference between the
amount of taxes voluntarily paid by individuals and corporations
and the amount that would be collected if the rate of compliance
with the tax laws were 100%-continues to grow.6 Some predict
that the gap will reach $113.7 billion in 1992, which is over one-
third of the projected federal budget deficit for the year.7 Predict-
ably, Congress, the Internal Revenue Service (the Service), and
other interested parties are scrambling for answers to the noncom-
many ways, taxpayers' neglect or deceit may prejudice the orderly and punctual
administration of the system as well as the revenues themselves"); HARRY G. BALTER,
FRAUD UNDER FEDERAL TAX LAw 9 (1951) ("The orderly, effective and punctual
administration of the federal revenue system... depends on the continuation of this
honesty on the part of the taxpayer." (citation omitted)).
4 See Chester N. Mitchell, Willingness-to-Pay: Taxation and Tax Compliance, 15
MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 127, 127 (1985) ("The House Ways and Means Committee
predicted in 1913 that Americans would 'cheerfully' support and sustain the new
federal income tax.").
5 See Curtis J. Berger, "Voluntaiy" Self-Assessment? The Unwilling Extraction of
Taxpayer Information, 42 U. PrrT. L. REV. 759, 760 (1981) (discussing the "arsenal of
enforcement and collection powers" Congress has since given the Internal Revenue
Service to combat noncompliance).
6 See, e.g., ABA COMM'N ON TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS 7 (1987) [hereinafter ABA COMPLIANCE REPORT] (graphically depicting the
growth in the tax gap from 1973 to 1981); "Make Risks High Enough" So Fewer Will
Cheat, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 19, 1982, at 46 [hereinafter Make Risks High
Enough] (quoting then-Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service Roscoe Egger,
Jr. as stating that the tax gap for 1982 was a projected $90 billion and growing).
7 See C.C. Berg, Operating Under the Table, 90 RESTAURANT BUS. MAC. 133 (1991),
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, RSTBUS File ("'We have projections of a tax gap
for the target year of 1992 for the corporate sector of roughly $31.1 billion. The
individual sector is another $82.6 billion.'" (quoting IRS Manhattan District Public
Affairs Officer Neil O'Keeffe)); see also Karen Riley, Corporate Tax Dodges Surging,
WASH. TIMEs, Apr. 18, 1991, at C1 ("'In 1992 the Internal Revenue Service has
estimated that [the tax gap] will total $114 billion-over one-third of the deficit
projected for that fiscal year.'" (quotingJennie S. Stathis, General Accounting Office
Director of Tax Policy and Administration Issues)). One commentator notes that
because of the underground economy, approximations of the compliance gap are
rough estimates and "obviously suspect." Michael J. Graetz & Louis L. Wilde, The
Economics of Tax Compliance: Fact and Fantasy, 38 NAT'L TAX J. 355, 356 (1985)
("Despite the relatively long history of these efforts [by both the Service and the
private sector to measure noncompliance], it is not unfair to say that empirical
uncertainties still abound."). Most observers suggest, however, that the errors
contained in these estimates tend to err on the conservative side. See id. at 356-57
(detailing reasons why the empirical data would tend to underestimate, rather than
overestimate, the tax gap).
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pliance problem. 8  Their efforts have produced a variety of
proposed solutions.
Some studies have suggested that the government should
encourage compliance by making a moral appeal to taxpayers to pay
up.9 This approach is attractive in theory,10 but has at least two
implementational drawbacks. First, "neutralization theory" suggests
that taxpayers can reduce the guilt feelings accompanying deviant
behavior by employing any of a variety of justifications." Some
experts contend that this neutralization process casts significant
doubt on the potential effectiveness of the moral appeal approach
8 See, e.g.; Compliance Gap: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the Comm.
on Finance, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 127 (1982) [hereinafter Compliance Gap Hearings]
(recording the Treasury Department's analysis of Senate Bill 2198, which "takes
important steps toward reducing the compliance tax gap as well as preserving the
integrity of our voluntary tax compliance system"); ABA COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra
note 6, at 1 (stating that the ABA formed the Commission with the purpose of
"recommend[ing] ways of improving compliance with federal income tax laws, with
the goal of reducing a tax gap that now appears to exceed $100 billion per year");
Byron L. Dorgan, Narrowing the $100 Billion Tax Gap, 37 TAX NOTES 925, 925 (1987)
(stating that Congressman Dorgan of North Dakota "formed a bipartisan task force
of tax professionals... to study the $100 billion tax gap and to recommend measures
by which the tax gap could be narrowed").
9 See, e.g., Robert Mason & Lyle D. Calvin, Public Confidence and Admitted Tax
Evasion, 37 NAT'L TAxJ. 489, 495 (1984) (stating that "the use of moral suasion to
obey tax laws" is a promising strategy for combatting noncompliance).
o See id. at 495 (stating that "[m]oral commitment to obey the law... is even a
stronger incentive" than threats of punishment).
1 See Quint C. Thurman et al., Neutralization and Tax Evasion: How Effective
Would a Moral Appeal Be in Improving Compliance to Tax Laws?, 6 LAW & POL'Y 309,
310 (1984) (applying neutralization theory to tax evasion). In the tax compliance
context, the standardjustifications used by taxpayers to neutralize noncompliance are
(1) "denial of responsibility" ("It is okay to claim an undeserved tax deduction in the
case where you are not really sure what the rule is."); (2) "condemnation of the
condemners" ("It is not wrong to fail to report certain income on your tax return
since the government passes laws which allow other people to do it... ."); (3) "denial
of injury" ("It is not so wrong to fail to report certain income since it does not really
hurt anyone .... ."); (4) "defense of necessity" ("It is okay not to report income since
inflation requires that you hold onto every dollar possible .... ."); (5) "metaphor of
the ledger" ("It is all right to occasionally fail to report certain income or claim an
undeserved tax deduction since you are generally a very loyal and law-abiding citizen
... ."); (6) "denial of the victim" ("It is not wrong to fail to claim certain income on
your tax return since the government is often careless with your tax dollar... ."); and
(7) "appeal to higher loyalties" (.It is okay to claim undeserved tax deductions or fail
to report certain income when you have donated more to charities and worthy causes
than you are allowed to deduct .... ."). Id. at 315; see KARYL A. KINSEY, THEORIEs
AND MODELS OF TAX CHEATING 22 (American Bar Foundation Working Paper No.
8717, 1988); see also Peter Dean et al., Taxpayers' Attitudes to Income Tax Evasion: An
Empirical Study, 1980 BRIT. TAX REV. 28, 33-36, 42 (discussing the interrelationship
between tax evasion and taxpayers' perception of the taxing system).
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and may render it virtually ineffective. 12 Second, there is the
possibility of "backfire."13 The concern here is that making broad
appeal to the public-possibly by implementing a "Just Say Nol"
campaign-may only have the effect of alerting honest taxpayers that
others are either simply not complying or cheating. Consequently,
"[a] moral appeal to the public designed to increase tax compliance
might backfire by providing yet another neutralization strategy to
justify tax evasion: If everyone else is cheating on their taxes, then
why shouldn't I?"14 Given the effects of neutralization theory and
the potential for backfire, 15 the moral appeal approach cannot be
solely depended upon to remedy the compliance problem.
Another recommendation has been to mount a public relations
campaign that would educate the public about the tax system and
increase the public's respect for it and the Internal Revenue
Service. 16 Like the moral appeal approach, this proposal also has
allure but suffers from potential implementation problems. The
12 See Mason & Calvin, supra note 9, at 495 ("Neutralization of compliance norms
... may well negate moral suasion efforts and the effect of neutralization on
compliance with tax laws is deserving of further study."); see also Thurman et al.,supra
note 11, at 324 ("[T]he use of neutralization strategies significantly reduces the
inhibiting effect of the threat of guilt feelings on tax evasion.").
13 SeeThurman et al.,supra note 11, at 325 (noting that in a classroom experiment
a moral appeal not to cheat alerted the honest that others were cheating with the
effect of causing them to cheat as well).
14 Id.
15 Neutralization theory and backfire are not the only problems with implement-
ing the moral appeal approach. Other complications include the perceptions of
honest and diligent taxpayers who already know that others are not complying or
cheating and who may see the moral appeal as an attempt to "beg" noncompliers to
pay. If the government is seen as "begging" noncompliers into compliance, honest
taxpayers' perceptions of the integrity of the tax system and the Service could be
weakened substantially.
Additionally, the effects of the political climate in which a moral appeal is made
must be recognized. For example, an appeal to taxpayers to "pay your fair share" is
far more likely to have a positive impact during times of intense patriotism than in
times of economic recession. Cf. Floyd K. Haskell, Tax Compliance & Tax Fairness, 27
TAx NoTEs 839, 842 (1985) ("Americans are patriotic. Given the chance, Americans
will choose their country over self-interest."). For any appeal to obtain optimal
results, it must be properly timed, and the duration of its effectiveness is largely out
of the control of the body making it.16 See ABA Section of Taxation, Report of the Second Invitational Conference on
Income Tax Compliance, 42 TAX LAW. 705, 727 (1989) (recommending public relations
efforts to increase compliance "by appeals to social conscience and by increasing
taxpayer awareness of the possibility of detection and sanctions"); see also ABA
COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 37 (calling for a "destigmatiz[ation of] the
Service among taxpayers" and a "more positive and understanding attitude towards
the public among Internal Revenue Service personnel").
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two major problems with this proposal appear to be the cost of
informing the public of the sanction structure and the inherently
adversarial role of the Service in enforcing compliance with the tax
laws.17 Thus, an effort to improve the image of the tax system
cannot, by itself, seriously be expected to close the compliance gap.
Still others favor the expansion of the traditional responses to
noncompliance, such as greater reporting requirements, increased
taxpayer services, and more audits.18 Each of these mechanisms
can be of only marginal significance, however. Few areas are not
already subject to information reporting, 19 and historical evidence
indicates that increased reporting requirements are not likely to
increase compliance significantly unless other measures are taken
to ensure that taxpayers take those requirements seriously.
20
Recommendations for increased services and audits ignore political
pressure to decrease the Service's budget,21 and while these
17 See ABA COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 19-20.
18 See, e.g., id. at 23-53 (recommending all of these approaches); Dorgan, supra
note 8, at 927-29 (same, in addition to tax simplification); see alsoJeffrey A. Dubin et
al., Penny-Wise and Pound-Foolish: New Estimates of the Impact of Audits on Revenue, 35
TAX NOTES 787 (1987) (advocating stepped-up auditing efforts); Gene Steuerle, The
Heyday of the Comprehensive Individual Audit Is Over, 53 TAX NOTES 859, 860 (1991)
(advocating further expansion of third-party information reporting).
19 See, e.g., ABA Section of Taxation, supra note 16, at 711 (stating that "[tlhe
Service's large commitment to information-matching programs surely has been
successful in terms of immediate revenue yield" but that such programs "may have
been counterproductve");James S. Henry, Noncompliance with U.S. Tax Law-Evidence
on Size, Growth, and Composition, 37 TAX LAW. 1, 21 (1983) (noting that information
reporting requirements have already been expanded to cover most forms ofincome).
20 See, e.g., Compliance Gap Hearings, supra note 8, at 127-28, 137-38, 152, 158
(quoting high-level Service officials as stating before Congress that information
reporting cannot in itself close the compliance gap and describing the continued
underreporting problems in the areas of tip and dividend income, where information
reporting is already required).
21 See, e.g., Dubin et al., supra note 18, at 788-89 (stating that "IRS budgets ...
have been hostage to the limited government philosophy of the Reagan Administra-
tion" and that the Reagan Administration proposed severe cuts in staff and funding
for the agency); Susan B. Long & David Burnham, Solving the Nation's Budget Deficit
with a Bigger, Tougher IRS: What Are the Realities?, 48 TAX NOTES 741 (1990)
(discussing the IRS and budgetary constraints on stepped-up enforcement efforts);
Martha Middleton, The Tax Gap: Why Don't People Pay Up?, 69 A.B.A. J. 572, 572
(1983) ("More auditing by IRS agents has been suggested... but the plain truth is
that there aren't enough agents and resources to do the job."); William E. Williams,
Strengthening IRS Examination and Collection Processes by Administrative Changes in
Staffing, Training Deploymen and Technology, in INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE: A REPORT
OF THE ABA SECTION ON TAXATION INvITATiONAL CONFERENCE ON INCOME TAX
COMPLIANCE 235, 237 (Phillip Sawicki ed., 1983) [hereinafter INCOME TAX COMPLI-
ANCE].
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mechanisms may have the potential to succeed over the long-term,
historical trends suggest that their implementation is unlikely in the
near future.
22
One frequently overlooked possibility is expanded criminal
liability. Criminal liability is a powerful incentive to obey the tax
laws.23 In fact, empirical research indicates that it may be one of
the few truly administrable deterrents to noncompliance. 24 The
Internal Revenue Code,25 however, provides for criminal sanctions
in only a very limited class of cases. 26 Furthermore, in those areas
22 See Steuerle, supra note 18, at 859 (discussing the dramatic decline in the audit
rate from the mid-1960s, when the rate was an estimated 5%, to .8% in 1990).
23 See Mason & Calvin, supra note 9, at 489 ("Fear of detection, of punishment or
the possibility of public disclosure of one's deviance are strong incentives to obey tax
laws.").
24 Empirical research indicates that criminal punishment is a powerful deterrent
to noncompliance with the tax laws. Within the criminal liability context, however,
an interesting dichotomy exists. In at least one empirical study, "substantial evidence
was found that a non-zero perception of prosecution risk had a powerful deterrent
impact" on noncompliance. Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, Tax Compliance and
Perceptions of the Risks of Detection and Criminal Prosecution, 23 LAw & Soc. REv. 209,
239 (1989). On the other, researchers have found no meaningful correlation between
the perceived severity of formal sanctions and deterrence. See id. at 238-39 (noting
that "[flew studies in the extensive deterrence literature have found evidence of a
deterrent effect of perceived severity of formal sanctions" and that "the long series
of negative findings concerning perceived severity ledjensen et al. (1978) to conclude
that the perceived severity of formal sanctions had no consequential deterrent effect"
(citing Gary F.Jensen et al., Perceived Risk of Punishment and Self-Reported Delinquency,
57 SocIAL FORCES 57 (1978))). The most plausible reasons for the dichotomy are
either the fixed costs associated with defending a criminal prosecution, see id., or the
fixed level of stigma that attaches to any level of criminal liability, see Anne D.
Samuels, Reckless Endangerment of an Employee: A Proposal in the Wake of Film
Recovery Systems to Make the Boss Responsible for His Crimes, 20 U. MICH. J. L. REF.
873, 893 n.1 12 (1987) ("Moral blame associated with a criminal conviction can be an
effective deterrent .... ."). Although the reasoning behind the effect is significant,
for the purposes of this Comment, the existence of the dichotomy is what is
important.
The upshot of these conclusions is the following- if a taxpayer perceives a non-
zero risk of criminal prosecution for a given activity, recognized as noncompliance,
then that taxpayer will be less likely to engage in that type of behavior. Intuitively,
there are at least two ways to increase that risk for a given taxpayer. One is to
enforce the existing criminal provisions more vigorously and to prosecute more
taxpayers for engaging in "criminal" behavior. This method, however, should only
affect taxpayers who perceive themselves as engaging in behavior that is now
recognized as "criminal"-namely, only "willful" behavior under I.R.C. §§ 7201-7207
(1988). Another way to increase the perceptions of prosecution risk would be to
increase the scope of criminal liability to encompass a larger variety of noncompli-
ance. This latter approach is examined in this Comment.
25 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-9602(b) (1988 & Supp. 1989).
26 The Internal Revenue Code's criminal provisions are contained in subchapter
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A of chapter 75, or §§ 7201-7232. The primary provisions for the purposes of this
Comment are those contained in §§ 7201-7203, 7206(1), and 7207.
Section 7201, a felony provision, prohibits tax evasion:
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax
imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other
penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction
thereof, shall be fined not more than $100,000 ($500,000 in the case of a
corporation), or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together with
the costs of prosecution.
I.R.C. § 7201 (1988). As the text provides and the Court has held, tax evasion
consists of three elements: (1) "willfulness;" (2) a tax deficiency; and (3) an
affirmative act of "evasion" or "attempted evasion." See Sansone v. United States, 380
U.S. 343, 351 (1965).
Section 7202, another felony provision, prohibits the "willful" underpayment of
tax:
Any person required under this title to collect, account for, and pay over
any tax imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect or truthfully
account for and pay over such tax shall, in addition to other penalties
provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be
fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both,
together with the costs of prosecution.
I.R.C. § 7202 (1988).
Section 7203 prohibits the "willful" failure to file a tax return:
Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or tax, or
required by this title or by regulations made under authority thereof to
make a return, keep any records, or supply any information, who willfully
fails to pay such estimated tax or tax, make such return, keep such records,
or supply such information, at the time or times required by law or
regulations, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty
of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more
than $25,000 ($100,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not
more than 1 year, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.
I.R.C. § 7203 (1988). Section 7203, as the text indicates, is a misdemeanor provision,
unlike §§ 7201 and 7202.
Section 7206(1), a felony provision, prohibits "false declarations." It provides:
Any person who... [wlillfully makes and subscribes any return, statement,
or other document, which contains or is verified by a written declaration
that it is made under the penalties of perjury, and which he does not believe
to be true and correct as to every material matter.., shall be guilty of a
felony ....
I.R.C. § 7206(1) (1988).
Section 7207, another misdemeanor section, prohibits the submission of false
documents:
Any person who willfully delivers or discloses to the Secretary any list,
return, account, statement, or other document, known by him to be
fraudulent or to be false as to any material matter, shall be fined not more
than $10,000 ... or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both.
I.R.C. § 7207 (1988).
The common element for all tax crimes in sections 7201-7207 is the element of
"willfulness." Under Cheek v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 604, 911-13 (1991), and
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where the Code does provide for criminal sanctions, the Supreme
Court has chosen to interpret the "willfulness" element very
narrowly-so narrowly that one scholar comments: "Proving that a
tax understatement was characterized by the requisite knowledge
and deliberate behavior is an extremely difficult matter and, in
practice, renders the criminal sanction ineffective for all but a very
few cases." 27 The propriety of this restriction on criminal penal-
ties by the courts will be examined in this Comment.
The position of this Comment is that a mild expansion of the
existing criminal sanctions to reach reckless28 noncompliance
29
may have an appropriate role in our tax system. A few points,
United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 359-61 (1973), "willfulness" has the same
meaning for all tax crimes. For a more detailed analysis of the criminal provisions
of the Code, see Substantive Tax Crimes and Related Offenses, 162 TAX MGMT. (BNA)
(2d), § A, 1105.
27 Graetz & Wilde, supra note 7, at 358 (citation omitted). And under the Court's
most recent restatement of the doctrine, see infra notes 35-43 and accompanying text,
the "willfulness" burden may be even more difficult for the government to carry. In
the words of one jury foreman of a recent post-Cheek case: "'A number of people
who voted not guilty truly thought [the defendant] was running around the law, but
[we could not convict] because of the evidence and the instructions of the judge. I
think it is going to be very tough for prosecutors [to obtain convictions in tax crime
cases].'" Howard Mintz, First Tax Case Under New Rules Ends in Acquittal; Appellate
Precedents Swayed Outcome, Juty Foreman Says, RECORDER,July 26, 1991, at 1, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, RECRDR File (quoting jury foreman David Holland).
28 "Reckless," for purposes of this proposal and as used throughout this
Comment, means that the taxpayer "consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(c) (1962). The application of "recklessness" in this
proposal differs, however, from its usual context in that it applies to an actor's
uncertainty regarding the law rather than the actor's uncertainty regarding factual
circumstances. See infra note 29.
29 Noncompliance, with regard to the tax laws, means that a taxpayer has not
remitted the full amount of taxes due the government in accordance with the Internal
Revenue Code, and broadly speaking, includes a failure to pay amounts that the
taxpayer has reported but not paid. See KARYL A. KINSEY, SURVEY DATA ON TAX
COMPLIANCE: A COMPENDIUM AND REVIEW 1 (American Bar Foundation Working
Paper No. 8716, 1984). This Comment, however, will focus only on the initial steps
in the "voluntary" compliance system-the self-assessment aspect.
"Reckless noncompliance," as used in this Comment, is defined in Part II.A.,
primarily by way of example. The concept is essentially composed of two elements:
(1) a subjective awareness on the part of the taxpayer that she is unsure what the law
requires in a particular instance; and (2) a lack of effort, or "due diligence," on her
part to discover-by looking exclusively to "authoritative sources"-what the law is.
Although under the Court's formulation of the "willfulness" doctrine such conduct
is not within the range of criminally punishable conduct, see infra notes 64 & 81 and
accompanying text, many researchers may nonetheless consider this conduct
"cheating," see infra note 80 (reproducing a question posed to a sample on the issue
of "tax evasion").
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however, must be made clear from the outset. First, this Comment
focuses on the individual, self-preparing taxpayer.30  The effects
of this proposal, if any, on paid tax-return preparers are not consid-
ered."l Second, although a vast array of civil penalties are avail-
able under the Code, an analysis of these provisions is beyond the
scope of this discussion, and for the most part, they are therefore
ignored in this Comment.3 2 Third, this Comment is not seeking
to promote the "wholesale application to tax crimes ... concepts
inappropriate to the unique characteristics of such crimes,
"33
which is feared by some experts. Rather, it attempts to analyze the
current boundaries of criminal liability under the tax law and to
determine whether, in light of the policies and purposes of the
taxing system, these boundaries are appropriate. Finally, implemen-
ting the proposal depends on continuing conventional enforcement
30 Although no specific estimates regarding the portion of the tax gap attributable
to the individual, self-preparing taxpayer can be found, underreporting of the tax
liabilities of individuals composed over 83 percent of the total tax gap in 1981, see
ABA COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 8-9; see also Berg, supra note 7 (projecting
that over 72% of the gap for 1992 will come from the individual sector), and at least
55% of the individuals filing returns are self-preparing filers, see Treasury, IRS Seek to
Improve Tax Compliance, 25 TAX NOTES 1172 (1984) (noting that IRS estimated that
45 percent of individual returns were prepared commercially). Thus, focusing on
issues faced by individual, self-preparing taxpayers would not appear to be unduly
narrow.
31 For a discussion of the theoretical implications involved with paid preparers,
see KARYL A. KINSEY, MEASUREMENT BIAS OR HONEST DISAGREEMENT? PROBLEMS OF
VALIDATING MEASURES OF TAX EVASION 4-5 (American Bar Foundation Working
Paper No. 8811, 1989).
32 As a side issue, the deterrent effect of conventional civil penalties is unclear.
As one report has stated, "results indicate that increases in the probability of a civil
fraud penalty are associated with decreases rather than increases in voluntary
compliance." Ann D. Witte & Diane F. Woodbury, The Effect of Tax Laws and Tax
Administration on Tax Compliance: The Case of the U.S. Individual Income Tax, 38 NAT'L
TAxJ. 1, 8 (1985). The primary reason cited for this effect is the relative secrecy with
which these penalties are imposed. See id.; see also ABA COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra
note 6, at 39 ("Deterrence messages will remain limited so long as... [tlhe Service
... does not have the authority to publicize civil fraud penalties that have successfully
been assessed against taxpayers."). Although the penalty provisions, which are
notorious for being reworked on a recurring basis, have been substantially revised by
IMPACT, the Improved Penalty Administration and Compliance Tax Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-239, §§ 7701-7743, 103 Stat. 2106, 2388-406 (1989) (codified at 26
U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. 1 1989)), the effects of these revisions are relatively unknown. See
generally MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN & BARBARA T. KAPLAN, CIVIL TAX PENALTIES REFORM:
ANALYSIS AND STRATEGIES (1990) (discussing IMPACT and the general history of the
civil penalty provisions).
3 ABA, Report of the Committee on Civil and Criminal Tax Penalties, 32 TAX LAW.
895, 896 (1979).
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mechanisms, especially the reporting requirements, taxpayer
services, and individual audits currently in force.
This Comment is composed of three parts. Part I examines the
historical development of the current standard of criminal liability
under the Internal Revenue Code, particularly the "willfulness"
requirement. Part I also considers the reasons given by the Court
for each major stage of the development and attempts to reconcile
them with the current liability standard. Part II introduces the
concept of the paradigmatic reckless noncomplier. The questions
whether, and to what degree, the tax system is suitable to a
"recklessness" standard of criminal liability are discussed, as are the
features the proposal should contain to ensure consistency with
underlying policies and general conceptions of fairness. The
political acceptability of the proposal is considered in Part III.
Perceived problems are discussed, as are the bases of possible
objections.
I. CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE:
STANDARDS AND POLICIES
Under current law, to be held criminally liable for a substantive
violation of the tax laws, a taxpayer must "willfully" commit the
proscribed offense.34 "Willfulness," however, is susceptible to
many different definitions, both within3 5 and outside3 6 the legal
context, and the legislative history surrounding the inclusion of the
willfulness requirement provides no guidance for a court's choice of
a particular meaning.3 7 Consequently, the courts have been forced
34 See I.R.C. §§ 7201-7207 (1988 & Supp. 1990); see also Graetz & Wilde, supra
note 7, at 358 (stating that "no criminal sanction ... can be imposed absent
satisfactory proof that [a] tax understatement was willful"); supra note 26 (describing
code provisions utilizing the concept of willfulness).
The criminal provisions of the federal tax statutes have contained a willfulness
requirement since 1919. SeeJoshua Stein, Note, Criminal Liability for Willful Evasion
of an Uncertain Tax, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1348, 1355 n.47 (1981) (tracing the history
of the "willfulness" requirement to the Act of Feb. 24, 1919, ch. 18, § 253, 40 Stat.
1085).
35 See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101 (1945) (stating that "'willful' is a
word 'of many meanings, its construction often being influenced by its context'")
(quoting Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 (1943)).
36 See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 2617 (1966) (giving four distinct definitions of "willful").
37 The virtual lack of legislative history has led the Court to state that "[t]he
legislative history of the section contains nothing helpful on the question [of
congressional intent]." Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 495 (1943).
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to 'back into' the meaning of "willfulness" by using various interpre-
tive tools, and by attempting to articulate policies justifying the
correct level of culpability for criminal sanctions in the tax context.
This Part traces the Court's major interpretations of "willfulness"
and, perhaps more importantly, attempts to identify the reasons
given for a particular interpretive step.
A. The Current Doctrine
Under the Court's most recent interpretation of "willfulness," as
stated in Cheek v. United States,3 8 a criminal violation of the Code's
statutory provisions requires the government to prove, among other
things,3 9 three separate elements: (1) that a duty existed under
the tax laws; (2) that the defendant had actual subjective knowledge
of that duty, and (3) that the defendant voluntarily and intentionally
violated that duty.40  A good faith belief-even if that belief is
unreasonable or completely irrational-that a statutory duty, as
opposed to a constitutional duty,41 did not exist will negate the
38 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991).
39 Criminal violations under §§ 7201-7207 require the prosecution to prove
elements other than willfulness. See supra note 26.
40 See Cheek, 111 S. Ct. at 610. In Cheek, the Court interpreted "willfully" in the
context of§ 7201 (tax evasion) and § 7203 (willful failure to file). See id. at 606. The
Court held that the meaning of "willfully" in both contexts is the same. Furthermore,
under United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 359-61 (1973), the Court assumed that
"willfulness" in the context of §§ 7201-7207 has the same general meaning. For
purposes of this Comment, this assumption remains in place. A reader desiring a
more detailed study of "willfulness" in a particular context, however, should not
overlook that, "[t]he lower courts ... have ... joined the Supreme Court in
recognizing that 'willful is a word of many meanings, its construction often being
influenced by its context.'" ROBERT M. SCHMIDT, LEGAL AND ACCOUNTING
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL TAX FRAUD 32 (1963) (quoting Spies v. United States, 317
U.S. 492,497 (1943)). Since methods ofproving "willfulness" differ from one case to
the next, treating "willfulness" as one unified topic could be misleading. See id. It is
hoped that so treating "willfulness" here will not prove confusing, however.
41 In Cheek, the Court drew this distinction with respect to what legally constitutes
a "good faith" claim. On the one hand, the Court concluded that, because of "[t]he
proliferation of statutes and regulations," Cheek, 111 S. Ct. at 609, a good faith
misunderstanding of the statutory framework of the Code negates willfulness. See id.
at 611. On the other, it concluded that a constitutional claim that the Code was
invalid was a "submission[] of a different order.... not aristing] from innocent
mistakes caused by the complexity of the Internal Revenue Code." Id. at 612 (citation
omitted). As such, the Court held that those claims did not, as a matter of law,
constitute a good faith defense sufficient to negate willfulness. See id. at 613. For a
discussion of the potential theoretical difficulties with this distinction, see Jules
Ritholz & David M. Kohane, Supreme Court Finds Subjective Ignorance of the Law a
Defense to Criminal Tax Fraud, 74J. TAX'N 254, 254-55 (1991).
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defendant's knowledge of the duty, and the government will have
the burden of disproving such a belief if one is claimed.4 2 Thus,
the government carries a heavy burden in proving that a noncompl-
iant act was committed with the requisite element of "willfulness."
This interpretation appears to be generally consistent with the
Court's prior interpretations, 43 all of which have the support of
persuasive policy rationale.
B. The Policies Underlying The Doctrine
In developing the current "willfulness" doctrine, the Court has
been forced to articulate its motivations. But even though the
Court frequently purports to be merely using standard interpretive
tools,44 the real purposes for the Court's restrictive interpretation
of "willfulness" can be derived clearly only by analyzing the Court's
opinions.
In United States v. Murdock,45 the first decision interpreting
"willfulness," the Court gave the most obvious reason for its
interpretation-the tax law's complexity. In Murdock, the Court
recognized that in defining "willfulness" in the tax context it was
working with a clean slate; and the Court acknowledged the wide
array of meanings that "willfully" could employ. 46  Although it
purported to use a standard tool of statutory interpretation by
looking to "the context in which it is used,"47 the Court chose to
look to the tax law's complexity and infer an intention on the part
of Congress that "a person, by reason of a bona fide misunder-
42 See Cheek, 111 S. Ct. at 611.
43 See United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976) (per curiam) ("[W]illful-
ness ... simply means a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.");
United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 361 (1973) (holding that "willfully" requires
more than a showing of careless disregard for the truth); Spies v. United States, 317
U.S. 492, 498 (1943) ("Willfulness ... include[s] some element of evil motive and
want of justification in view of all the financial circumstances of the taxpayer.");
United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 398 (1933) (finding that the statute makes
"bad faith or evil intent" an "element of the offense"). Although some commentators
have correctly recognized that these definitions of "willfulness" are not identical, see,
e.g., Elliot Silverman, Turning the Other Cheek: Tax Fraud, Tax Protest and the
Willfulness Requirement, 69 TAXEs 302, 303 (1991) (stating that the "Supreme Court
did not definitively settle on a single definition of 'willfulness' until 1976"), these
definitions are all consistently restrictive.
" See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
45 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
46 See id. at 394-95 (citing a range of cases and discussing various meanings of
"willful").
47 Id. at 395.
CRIMINAL TAX LIABILITY
standing as to his liability for the tax, as to his duty to make a
return, or as to the adequacy of [his] records ... should [not]
become a criminal by his mere failure to measure up to the
prescribed standard of conduct."48  Thus, heavy emphasis was
placed on the perceived unfairness of attaching stigma and blame,
and inflicting punishment on the innocently mistaken taxpayer.
Another distinct reason for the restrictive definition can be
found in Spies v. United States.49 There, the Court's rationale for
reversing a lower court's conviction of a taxpayer for attempted tax
evasion was not only the two justifications offered in MurdockM°
complexity of the tax law and standard statutory construction-but
also a "traditional aversion to imprisonment for debt."51 The
Court's reliance on this analogy to debtors' prisons,5 2 however, is
subject to legitimate criticisms.
One important distinction is that, under the Code, a tax
deficiency is not always a necessary condition for the imposition of
criminal liability. For example, in a prosecution for a violation of
section 7206(1), willfully committing perjury, a tax deficiency is not
even an element of the crime;53 rather, the falsehood is the
48 Id. at 396.
49 317 U.S. 492 (1943).
50 In Spies, the Court offered a variation of the "innocently mistaken taxpayer"
rationale ofMurdock, seesupra text accompanying notes 46-48, by stating that "the law
is complicated, accounting treatment of various items raises problems of great
complexity, and innocent errors are numerous .... It is not the purpose of the law
to penalize frank difference of opinion or innocent errors made despite the exercise of
reasonable care." Spies, 317 U.S. at 496 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The
Court also included the contextual interpretation argument with explicit reference to
Murdock. See id. at 497-98.
5' Spies, 317 U.S. at 498.
52 For a general discussion of the history of debtors' prisons, see Richard Ford,
Imprisonment for Debt, 25 MICH. L. REv. 24, 24-34 (1926).
53 See, e.g., United States v. Olgin, 745 F.2d 263, 272 (3d Cir. 1984) (filing and
subscribing to false corporate income tax returns a crime), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099
(1985); United States v. Carter, 721 F.2d 1514, 1539 (11th Cir.) ("Section 7206(1) is
a fraud statute and ... does not require the prosecution to prove the existence of any
taxable income."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984); United States v. Garcia, 553 F.2d
432,432 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (holding that trial court did not err in refusing
to permit defendant to introduce evidence of what tax might be owing where issue
is false statement); United States v. Ballard, 535 F.2d 400, 404 (8th Cir.) (citing
precedent "ma[king] clear that under § 7206(1), the Government [does] not need to
establish an actual tax deficiency in a § 7206(1) prosecution"), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
918 (1976); United States v. Jernigan, 411 F.2d 471, 473 (5th Cir.) ("[I]t was not
necessary for the Government to prove a deficiency in tax for the years in question."),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 927 (1969); Schepps v. United States, 395 F.2d 749, 749 (5th
Cir.) (holding that trial court's refusal to allow evidence that falsity resulted in no
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crime.54 But willfulness is an element of all tax crimes. Thus, by
restricting the meaning of "willfulness," the Court restricted all
forms of criminal liability under the Code, not just those requiring
a deficiency, and the Court's "debtors' prison" analogy is over-
broad.
Another distinction exists between the traditional debtors'
prison case and a tax deficiency. In the former, the debt resulted
from a voluntary exchange between the debtor and the creditor,
where both parties assumed a certain level of risk. The public's
notorious distaste for debtors' prisons may, in part, result from the
government's interference with this voluntary risk allocation by
imposing the threat of imprisonment upon the defaulting debtor.
In the tax context, however, the government imposes the obligation
on the taxpayer and since no voluntary transaction occurred, the
government cannot be said to have assumed the risk of a taxpayer's
default. In other words, the government is an involuntary credi-
tor.55 Furthermore, courts frequently allow the threat of imprison-
ment to loom large in similar contexts where duties to pay are
imposed unilaterally by the government. A notable example is an
estranged spouse's failure to pay child support.
56
Finally, although the Court's "traditional aversion to imprison-
ment for debt" may explain why it dislikes criminal liability for
violations of the tax laws in the abstract, it fails to explain its
decision to define "willfully" as it did. Taking the baseline rule to
be that some level of culpability justifies imprisonment for violations
deficiencywas not error), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 925 (1968); Silverstein v. United States,
377 F.2d 269,270 (per curiam) (1st Cir. 1967) (holding that trial court had not erred
in refusing to permit defendant to establish the small amount of additional tax owed
where violation of false statement statute was charged).
54 See, e.g., United States v. Marabelles, 724 F.2d 1374, 1380 (9th Cir. 1984)
(noting that the "requisite affirmative acts are established by the filing of the false tax
returns"); Gaunt v. United States, 184 F.2d 284, 288 (1st Cir. 1950) ("[T]he
subsection's purpose is to impose the penalties for perjury upon those who willfully
falsify their returns regardless of the tax consequences of the falsehood."), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 917 (1951).
55 Cf. Michael R. Arner, The Worthier Creditors (And a Cheerfor the King) -Revisited,
53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 389, 391 (1979) (discussing similar arguments made by the
Treasury during the adoption of the Bankruptcy Code).
56 See e.g., George James, States Using Strict Tactics to Collect Child Support, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 20, 1989, at B1, B2 (noting that some states are using jail time as an
incentive for delinquent fathers to pay child support);Jail Is Okay as Child-Support
Weapon, Cm. TRIB., Apr. 28, 1988, at 19 (stating that "[t]he U.S. Supreme Court...
effectively ratified the procedures most states use to have fathers held in contempt
of court and possibly be sentenced to jail for failing to pay child support").
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of the taxing statutes, as indicated by Congress' enacting sections
7201-7207, the analogy to debtors' prisons seems only to justify
defining "willfulness" as something more than strict liability or
negligence. 57 Once the Court evaluates various levels of subjective
awareness, the fact that a debt was owed appears to be of little
relevance; the crime is the violation of the statute. While it is
obvious that the Court used the analogy to debtors' prisons to
restrict the scope of criminal liability under the tax law, the
propriety of that reliance is suspect.
In United States v. Pomponio58 and later in Cheek,59 the Court
added little to the rationale for limiting the standard for "willful-
ness" under the tax laws, but it did reaffirm its reliance on the
complexity argument in Murdock. In Cheek, the Court stated that
the special interpretation of "willfulness" in the tax context is
"largely due to the complexity of the tax laws." 60 The Court
reintroduced its view that Congress must have intended that
innocent mistakes would not be punished.61 In view of the Cheek
Court's reaffirmation of only those two justifications, and the
questionable nature of one of the Court's other purported justifica-
tions (the "imprisonment for debt" rationale), the decision to define
"willfulness" narrowly in the tax context can be seen as based on a
single synthesized justification: the fear that a taxpayer, despite the
exercise of reasonable care, will become confused by the tax law
and, because of an innocent mistake, be labelled and punished as a
criminal. Whether the Court's articulated standard is the best way
to protect against that fear and balance the competing policy
interests involved, however, is another matter.
Interestingly, the refined standard handed down in Cheek could
have anomalous results when reconciled with the Court's other
stated policies and the characteristics of the American income tax
collection system. As stated previously, the Court's primary reason
for narrowing the scope of criminal liability in the tax context was
its fear that a diligent taxpayer would be criminally sanctioned
"despite the exercise of reasonable care." 62 The opinion and rule
handed down in Cheek, however, fails to encourage the taxpayer
57 For definitions of "strict liability" and "negligence," see infra notes 77-78.
58 429 U.S. 10 (1976) (per curiam).
59 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991).
60 Id. at 609.
61 See id. at 609-10.
62 Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 496 (1943) (emphasis added).
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diligence the Court appears blindly to assume and, indeed, may
even discourage a confused taxpayer from seeking answers to her
questions. The most notable comment of the Cheek Court on this
subject appeared in a discussion of how the knowledge of the
defendant in a tax evasion case is to be proven. The Court stated:
Of course, in deciding whether to credit Cheek's good-faith belief
claim, the jury would be free to consider any admissible evidence
from any source showing that Cheek was aware of his duty to file
a return and to treat wages as income, including evidence showing
his awareness of the relevant provisions of the Code or regula-
tions, of court decisions rejecting his interpretation of the tax law,
of authoritative rulings of the Internal Revenue Service, or of any
contents of the personal income tax return forms and accompany-
ing instructions that made it plain that wages should be returned
as income.
6 3
So, assuming that (1) there is no criminally enforceable duty to read
the instructions accompanying federal income tax forms,64 and (2)
a confused taxpayer is aware that the current standard for imposing
criminal liability is that ignorance of the law is an excuse, 65 this
63 Cheek, 111 S. Ct. at 611 (footnote omitted).
6 No case appears to state this rule in "black letter" terms, but this point may be
demonstrated easily from the language of Cheek. First, under Cheek an irrational
belief may negate willfulness. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text. Second,
the Court placed no restrictions on the sources from which that belief could be
derived, and it is obvious that an irrational belief held in good faith could be obtained
from a large number of sources other than the official instructions. The Courts of
Appeals have begun to recognize this. See Tax Division Official Says "Cheek" Decision
Given Broad Application by Appeals Courts, WASH. INSIDER, Oct. 29, 1991, available in
LEXIS, BNA Library, BNAWI File (detailing how the Cheek decision has broadened
the class of evidence that can be introduced in a criminal tax proceeding and
discussing other evidentiary issues). Thus, it is clear that there is no requirement for
self-preparing taxpayers to even attempt to read the official Service instructions to
avoid the threat of criminal prosecution.
65 The notion that the average taxpayer will be aware that the government's
burden is extremely heavy is not as far-fetched as it sounds given the enormous
amount of publicity that the Cheek decision has generated. A small sampling of the
post-Cheek hype-both accurate and inaccurate-includes: Greg Henderson, Court
Gives Added Protection to Those Charged with Tax Evasion, UPI, Jan. 8, 1991, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI file ("The Supreme Court ruled... that a sincere belief
that tax laws do not apply to a defendant can be used as a defense in a tax evasion
trial."); David G. Savage, Tax Protestors Cannot Be Jailed If Beliefs Are Sincere, L.A.
TIMEs, Jan. 9, 1991, at Al ("The Supreme Court made it harder ... for the
government to punish tax protestors, ruling that a person who sincerely believes he
is exempt from tax laws may not be jailed for a criminal tax violation."); Tax
"Protesting" Ruled Not "Willful" Evasion, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 8, 1991, at P3 ("Americans
who refuse to pay their federal income tax because they sincerely believe the tax law
is unconstitutional cannot be convicted of'willful' tax evasion.");Jay R. Weill, Hyped
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passage indicates that reading the Form 1040 instructions or other
I.R.S. publications makes it easier for the government to prove, via
circumstantial evidence, actual knowledge of the law in the event of
a criminal prosecution. For example, if evidence that the taxpayer
actually read or even skimmed the relevant instructions is presented
in a criminal proceeding, the taxpayer must show not only that her
belief with regard to the law was in fact held in good faith, but she
will also have to refute the logical presumption that she became
aware of the law by reading the instructions. In other words, for
the truly confused taxpayer, reading the instructions and getting the
answer wrong66 only makes it more difficult to demonstrate
innocence.
Conversely, it could be argued that the requirement of "good
faith" on the part of the taxpayer imposes a duty to read the
instructions or, at least, to be aware of the most obvious provisions
of the law.67 But such an argument proves too much for at least
two reasons. First, in Cheek, the Court held that before a taxpayer
can be found to have "willfully" committed a noncompliant act, the
government must prove that a positive, affirmative duty in fact
exists.68 Since there is, in fact, no duty to read the instructions,
the taxpayer cannot be guilty of violating that "duty." Second, the
Court stated that any belief that a statutory duty did not exist-
however unreasonable-if genuinely held, negates knowledge. This
would appear equally applicable to any duty which could be imposed
under the tax law, including a duty to become aware of the law
itself. Consequently, a more stringent interpretation of "good faith"
cannot be depended upon to remedy the problem, and any finding
that a taxpayer is criminally liable because she failed to read the
instructions is simply an incorrect application of the law.
Reports of Court Rulings May Spawn Suits, N.J. L.J.,Jan. 31, 1991, at 9 (stating that one
"radio announcer declared the decision to be a victory for the tax-protest move-
ment"). Additional danger and complexity results from the fact that during the
hysteria of the celebration, many of those publicizing the opinion read it wrong. See
id. (stating that a radio comment publicizing the opinion "bore no resemblance" to
the Court's actual holding). -
66 This is a very real fear for the Court. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying
text.
67 Cf Jonathan Eisenberg, "Willful Violations" of the Federal Securities Laws: Why
the SEC's No-Fault Approach Is Now Ripe for Reection, LAW & Bus. INSIGHTS (Prentice
Hall), Aug. 1991, at 13 & n.49 (reviewing the Cheek decision and stating that, "[t]he
Court did not address whether recklessness would be sufficient to negate good faith").
68 See Cheek, 111 S. Ct. at 610. For a discussion of the elements.of willfulness, see
supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
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Therefore, although the Court's reasons for narrowing criminal
liability in the tax context are the result of very real concerns, the
standard articulated by the Court at least arguably, goes too far and
may very well discourage confused taxpayers from voluntarily
seeking answers to their questions. Accordingly, a refined level of
criminal liability should be considered.
II. THE PROPOSAL
As discussed above, the current standard for the imposition of
criminal liability under the tax law is fundamentally inconsistent
with both the policies from which it is derived and the characteris-
tics necessary for the efficient administration of the American
income tax system.69 Consequently, in the context of the narrow
scope of liability for noncompliant acts allowed by the Court, there
are really only two alternatives available to remedy the problem: (1)
altering the standard for criminal liability under the Code; or (2)
doing away with criminal liability entirely. This Comment chooses
the former for two reasons.
First, it is readily acknowledged that to enforce the tax laws as
they are to be administered under the American system, "[a]
punishment component is essential" in the penalty structure.
70
The trick, of course, is to select the appropriate amount of
punishment and create sufficient incentives to reinforce compliance
norms. 71 In other words, though punishing deviance is necessary
in our "voluntary" system, the level of punishment imposed should
not breed resentment72 or cause taxpayers to search inefficiently
for answers to their questions; taxpayers should be truthful but, at
the same time, should not be needlessly intimidated or overworked.
To the extent that these attributes can be achieved, policymakers
ought to strive to do so. But the important point is the recognition
that a punishment component is indeed necessary.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, some level of criminal
liability for some violations of the tax laws should exist simply
69 See supra notes 58-68 and accompanying text.
70 ABA COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 22.
71 See Mark H. Moore, On the Office of Taxpayer and the Social Process of Taxpaying,
in INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE, supra note 21, at 275, 283 (noting that "if enforcement
alone is expanded, the norms supporting tax compliance may deteriorate even more
quickly").
72 Cf Mason & Calvin, supra note 9, at 494-95 (stating an empirical preference for
compliance efforts that do not create "resistance" to the tax laws).
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because it is the will of the people, as evidenced by the existence of
I.R.C. sections 7201-7207. Congress is composed of democratically
elected representatives who, by enacting the predecessors of
sections 7201-7207, merely carried out the will of the electorate.
Since these provisions have not been repealed, they should be
accorded considerable deference. Unless some flaw can 'be found
in the political process that allowed these provisions to be enacted,
it should be presumed that there is legitimate public support for
some level of criminal deterrence and punishment for noncom-
pliance with the tax law.
78
Therefore, assuming that some level of criminal liability under
the taxing system is desirable, we must recognize that the Supreme
Court-not Congress-has been primarily responsible for defining
what constitutes a criminal act under the Code. 74 Although the
policies articulated by the Court in developing the current standard
appear valid, it is contended that the resulting standard is not
appropriate. What follows is a proposal for a more appropriate
standard for liability under the Code-one which would be fair to
the individual taxpayer, the tax system, and the public at large.
A. Understanding Noncompliance: The Paradigmatic Case of
the Reckless Noncomplier
Although it would be nice if all taxpayers agreed with Mr. Justice
Holmes's comment about his fondness for taxes, 75 such an expec-
tation is unrealistic. It is not unrealistic, however, for society to
demand, through the criminal law, that there be some absolute
minimum duty to at least attempt to comply with the tax laws. This
Comment draws the line for that absolute minimum at a standard
of recklessness. 76 By recklessness, this Comment means exactly
that-not strict liability,77 not negligence, 78 but recklessness. To
7 The argument that the presence of open political processes is the best criterion
for reviewing a statute is most closely associated withJohn Hart Ely. SeeJOHN H. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 73-104 (1980).
74 See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
75 See supra text accompanying note 1.
76 For the meaning of "recklessness" as used in this Comment, see supra note 28.
77 "Strict liability," as used in the criminal law, is generally understood to mean
liability without regard for fault. See I WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR.,
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 3.8 (1986).
78 The Model Penal Code defines "negligence" as follows:
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense
when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
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make the meaning of recklessness plain, consider the following
hypothetical: Taxpayer T is completing her income tax return for
the immediately preceding taxable year. In doing so, she comes to
line six-the dependency exemption line. In determining whether
her son, twenty-seven years of age and a full-time student with gross
income over the prescribed limit, is a person for whom she is
eligible to claim an exemption, she travels through the following
thought processes. First, she realizes that she is not sure what the
rule governing this situation is, and she cannot remember whether
she claimed him last year. Second, she realizes either that there is
a rule covering the situation or that there is a substantial likelihood
that there is a rule governing the situation, and, in either instance,
that the rule could probably be found by looking through the
instructions. Then, she determines that it is simply not worth the
bother to attempt to look the rule up and, taking the benefit of the
doubt, she claims him. Here, T has met all of the requirements of
the reckless noncomplier: she disregarded a substantial and
unjustified risk that she was violating the tax laws, and chose to act
in violation of the law anyway.
79
material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of
such a nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering
the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him
involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable
person would observe in the actor's situation.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (d) (1962). The critical distinction between negligence
and recklessness under the Model Penal Code is the actor's awareness of the risk. See
1 LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 77, at § 3.7.
79 A major debate in the compliance literature concerns defining taxpayer
behavior. As LeDuc explains:
The application of [the noncompliance] analysis to the efforts to improve
the self-assessment system requires a further injection of theory because of
the uncertainty that surrounds the "voluntariness" of compliance. In
particular, is the paradigm of noncompliance the taxpayer who seeks to self-
assess fairly but who, through lack of diligence or carelessness, omits
reportable income or overstates deductions? Or is the paradigm of
noncompliance the taxpayer who will fairly self-assess only if he believes that
the risk of the penalties for being apprehended exceeds the potential
rewards of compliance?
LeDuc, supra note 2, at 1029 (citations omitted).
Robert Melia provides one of the most concise descriptions of the various models
of taxpayer compliance. See Robert M. Melia, Is the Pen Mightier Than the Audit?, 34
TAX NoTEs 1309, 1309-10 (1987). The models described in his analysis are: (1) the
economic model; (2) the uncertainty model; (3) the norms of compliance model; and
(4) the inertia model. See id. The "paradigmatic noncomplier" described in this
Comment does not fit any one of Melia's models, but can be described as a
combination of the last three. For other discussions of the theories of taxpayer
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Before considering the appropriateness of imposing criminal
sanctions on the reckless noncomplier, two important observations
should be made. First, evidence suggests that behavior like that in
the hypothetical may be typical for some taxpayers.80 Second, it
is plain that T would not be subject to criminal sanctions under
current law since she did not knowingly violate the relevant provi-
sions of the Code.81 Although this particular example is a thought
experiment, a large number of actual taxpayers are probably acting
in a similar manner without the threat of criminal sanctions.
In considering the fairness of criminally punishing the reckless
noncomplier, it is important to first consider the fears articulated
by the Court in its own development of the "willfulness" doctrine:
the fear that the innocent, diligent, but confused taxpayer would
commit an error and, as a result, become a criminal. This concern
is a very real one, and given the enormous complexity of the Code,
fairness dictates that simple errors should not result in criminal
liability. Punishing innocent mistakes with criminal sanctions would
also do little to improve compliance, since innocent errors are
unlikely to be deterred. For expanded criminal liability to be fair,
therefore, there must be a second component: a "due diligence"
component.
This due diligence requirement could protect against the
imposition of liability when the jury finds that the defendant took
appropriate steps to consult authoritative resources as necessary
under the circumstances. For most taxpayers, resort to the Form
1040 instructions likely would be sufficient.8 2 By allowing the jury
behavior, see KINSEY, supra note 11; KENT W. SMITH & KARYL A. KINSEY, UNDER-
STANDING TAXPAYING BEHAVIOR: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK WITH IMPLICATIONS
FOR RESEARCH (American Bar Foundation Working Paper No. 8724, 1988).
80 See, e.g., Thurman et al., supra note 11, at 315 (finding that 61.4 percent of
people surveyed did not strongly disagree with the following statement: "It is okay
to claim an undeserved tax deduction in the case where you are not really sure what
the rule is....").
81 For a discussion of the necessary elements of "willfulness" under current law,
see supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text. Case law indicates that a mere showing
of recklessness will not suffice for a criminal tax conviction. See, e.g., United States
v. Fletcher, 928 F.2d 495, 502 (2d Cir.) ("[T]he jury was properly warned that reckless
ignorance of the tax law does not constitute willful intent to violate the law."), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 67 (1991); United States v. Eilertson, 707 F.2d 108, 109-10 (4th Cir.
1983) (reversing a lower-court case tried on the ground that equating willfulness with
"careless and reckless disregard" was error under United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S.
346 (1973)); United States v. Wolters, 656 F.2d 523, 525 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that
the term "willful" properly excludes "reckless disregard").
82 Ideally, the "due diligence" component would take into consideration all of the
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to determine if the taxpayer, considering all of her relevant
characteristics, took appropriate steps to investigate a conscious
inquiry, the fears of the Court and the public-at-large could largely
be laid to rest.
B. The Propriety of Criminally Punishing
the Reckless Noncomplier
In considering the appropriateness of criminally punishing the
reckless noncomplier, the first point that should be addressed is an
obvious one: Is the tax system conducive to the imposition of a
"recklessness" standard?
The mere mechanics of the tax system make it conducive to a
recklessness standard. As one researcher has noted, "[u]nlike other
crimes-even economic crimes-tax compliance requires a report-a
tax return-through which the taxpayer directly conveys a significant
amount of information to the cognizant law enforcement agen-
cy. "83 The distinction is critical; it emphasizes how tax compli-
ance, as opposed to other duties prescribed by statute (such as
obeying speed limits or stopping at traffic lights) involves clear and
unmistakable instances where the taxpayer must take affirmative
steps to answer questions plainly posited to her. These questions
should, for most taxpayers, trigger subjective inquiries into what the
law is and how the law is to be applied to her particular situation.
Granted, this prompting is more clearly demonstrated in the realm
of taking deductions (an affirmative step), than in forgetting to
report income (which may occur by omission), but implementing
relevant factors concerning the defendant, such as education or personal experience
with tax matters, to determine what would be appropriate under the circumstances.
Adopting such a standard should not be difficult in this situation since these factors
are already routinely considered in the "willfulness" context. See Fletcher, 928 F.2d at
501-02 (holding that "the trier of fact may properly consider the general educational
background and expertise of the defendant as bearing on the defendant's ability to
form the requisite willful intent"); see also United States v. Shields, 642 F.2d 230 (8th
Cir.) ("Evidence of Shields' prior filing and taxpaying history, and IRS attempts to
explain the legal requirements to him are sufficient to sustain thejury's finding that
Shields was aware of his legal obligations imposed by the tax laws and intentionally
chose not to comply with them."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 848 (1981); United States v.
MacLeod, 436 F.2d 947, 949 (8th Cir.) ("The government... need not produce direct
evidence of guilty intent. It can establish a willful violation ... by circumstantial
evidence alone."), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 907 (1971). Resort to the standard Form 1040
instructions should be sufficient for most taxpayers, who have no technical
background or training in tax issues or accounting.
8' Graetz & Wilde, supra note 7, at 359.
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the expanded reporting requirements, as some have suggested,
would significantly alleviate this problem.84 For example, if the
taxpayer receives a Form 1099 or other information notice in the
mail, its arrival should prompt the taxpayer to ask: "Why did I
receive this form?" Once the thought processes are triggered, the
steps taken should be the same as in the deduction context. Thus,
the mechanics of the existing tax system appear quite conducive to
a "recklessness" standard of liability.
Importing a "due diligence" requirement to the tax system
should also work well to protect the innocent and the truly diligent.
Virtually all potential jurors for a criminal tax prosecution are
subject to the tax laws. This commonality with the defendant
should allow the jury to judge the defendant's conduct fairly, and
determine whether the defendant was truly diligent under contem-
porary notions of what is "diligent" under the circumstances.
Another question that should be asked in judging the propriety
of criminally punishing the reckless noncomplier is whether it will
really help to improve compliance. With regard to taxpayers
already engaged in acts similar to those of the "reckless complier,"
empirical evidence indicates that it should. 5  There is also,
however, a strong argument to be made that expanding liability
would have positive effects on all taxpayers, not just those directly
affected by the expansion. It is commonly accepted that a general
perception of growing noncompliance can directly affect an honest
taxpayer's decision whether to remain honest in later years.8 6 In
other words, honest taxpaying, in some repects, can be viewed as an
act of faith-a taxpayer does her public duty in the hope that her
fellow members will also comply8 7 Theoretically, then, the
' See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
85 See supra note 24 (discussing the empirical evidence concerning the deterrent
effect of increasing the perceived risk of criminal prosecution). This effect assumes
that information concerning the expansion of liability would be relayed to the
taxpaying public so that the perceived risk of prosecution would increase.
8 6 See ABA COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 8 ("[T]ax cheating in turn feeds
upon itself and further contributes to that decline .... If citizens continue to cheat
with impunity, honest taxpayers will increasingly ask themselves how high a price they
are willing to pay for their honesty."). These statements would appear to have equal
force with respect to lax reporting. Cf id. at 56 n.16 (noting that "cheating" is
broader than the current legal definition of "fraud" or "evasion")).
87 Others have come to similar conclusions on this point. See Melia, supra note
79, at 1310 ("Evidence suggests that the strength of the commitment [of honest
taxpayers] to comply is influenced by whether taxpayers believe that other taxpayers
are also complying. In essence, taxpayers are saying 'if you pay your taxes, I'll pay
mine; but if you cheat, I'll cheat, too.'" (citing HANs VAN DEN DOEL, DEMOCRACY AND
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expansion of liability would not only deter those already adopting
lax reporting habits, it would be positive reinforcement for the
honest and diligent taxpayers looking for a reaffirmation of their
hopes.
Finally, there is a normative argument to be made for the
propriety of punishing the reckless noncomplier. The issue is
whether a lack of diligence in complying with the tax laws is
deserving of criminal punishment. The answer to this question
requires an analysis of both the gravity of the harm and the
culpability of the actor.
8 8
The gravity of the harm caused by noncompliance with the tax
laws is highly debatable. For some, noncompliance or tax evasion
simply represents a "victimless"89 act of self-interest.90  In fact,
as indicated previously, the Court, in Spies v. United States,91
articulated the proposition that a taxpayer's understatement of a tax
liability was not much different from defaulting on a private
debt.92 This Comment, however, takes the view that noncompli-
ance is by no means "victimless." As one researcher has stated, the
victims of noncompliance "are honest taxpayers, who must shoulder
more of the tax burden, and citizens dependent upon public
services that may be underfunded due to tax evasion."
93 Although
these victims are "not immediately apparent to many taxpayers,"
94
WELFARE ECONOMICS (1979) and MICHAEL LAVER, THE POLITICS OF PRIVATE DESIRES
(1981))).
88 See, e.g., HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 17, 17-34
(1963) ("The rationale of the criminal law rests on three concepts: offense, guilt, and
punishment."); Michael B. Metzger, Corporate Criminal Liability for Defective Products:
Policies, Problems, and Prospects, 73 GEO. L.J. 1, 6-12 (1984) (analyzing various theories
of criminal punishment in the context of products liability).
89 See, e.g., Benjamin B. Sendor, Crime as Communication: An Interpretive Theoty of
the Insanity Defense and the Mental Elements of Crime, 74 CEO. L.J. 1371, 1399 n.128
(1985) (including tax evasion among the class of"victimless" crimes); Evan Haglund,
Note, Impeaching the Underworld Informant, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407, 1411 (1990)
(same); see also ABA COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 21 (acknowledging that
"[tax compliance norms are not rooted in basic social values about harming or
violating the rights of others").
90 See Moore, supra note 71, at 275, 280-82 (hypothesizing that evasion is
motivated by self-interest).
9' 317 U.S. 492 (1943).
92 For a discussion of the holding and rationale of Spies, see supra notes 49-51 and
accompanying text.
93 Melia, supra note 79, at 1311; see also BALTER, supra note 3, at 11 ("[H]e who
does not pay his legally due share of taxes, is automatically shifting his share, and
thus adding to the already heavy burden of the honest taxpayer.").
94 ABA COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 21.
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they do exist. A noncompliant, moreover, cannot be viewed in
splendid isolation. Growing noncompliance will have a tendency to
"snowball," and erode further "the moral fabric that sustains our
voluntary tax assessment system."95  It sets a dangerous example
for others to follow; it potentially leads the honest taxpayer
astray.96 Noncompliers must shoulder part of the responsibility
for contributing to the low level of compliance morality and
discouraging other honest taxpayers from performing their duties
diligently. As such, the harm imposed by the reckless noncomplier
on the public trust and fellow citizens is simply greater than that
imposed by a defaulting debtor. Consequently, the reckless
noncomplier is deserving of more punishment.
The culpability of the reckless noncomplier, while admittedly
less than that of the intentional evader, may also be deserving
criminal punishment. Given the complexity of the tax laws97 and
the frequency with which they change, 98 the reckless taxpayer who
95 Id. at 8.
96 As one researcher has noted:
Noncompliance is likely to be an accelerating social process. Reports of an
increasing degree of noncompliance have the effect of diminishing others'
fears about the perceived risks of underpayment and thereby increase the
likelihood of even more widespread noncompliance. Concern about the
long-term consequences of this cascading process arise from the fact that
the governmental benefits of preventing noncompliance go well beyond the
actual revenues collected; the benefits include the discounted value of all
future revenues that might otherwise be lost because of evasion.
Alfred Blumstein, Models for Structuring Taxpayer Compliance, in INCOME TAX
COMPLIANCE, supra note 21, at 159, 167.97 See, e.g.,James S. Eustice, Tax Complexity and the Tax Practitioner, 45 TAXL. REV.
7, 11-20 (1989) (discussing the sources and causes of complexity, and the roles of
Congress, the Treasury, the tax bar, and educators in perpetuating the system); Make
Risks High Enough, supra note 6, at 47 (statement of Roscoe L. Egger, Jr., then-
Commissioner of Internal Revenue discussing the Service's attempts to simplify the
tax law and tax forms); Sidney I. Roberts et al., A Report on Complexity and the Income
Tax, 27 TAX. L. REV. 325, 327 (1972) (addressing complexity of the law); Laura
Saunders, One Man's Problem Is Another's Opportunity, FORBES, Mar. 7, 1988, at 105-06
(noting the complexity in the tax law that exists even after the "simplification" efforts
of the 1986 Tax Reform Act). Although some see simplification as an answer to the
compliance problem, see e.g., Dorgan, supra note 8, at 927 (positing that taxpayers
who understand their obligations are more likely to pay them in full), others see the
complexity as costs of equity and fairness, seeFinaglingon Taxes Approaching the Crisis
Stage, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan. 9, 1981, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PRNews File
(quoting MichaelJ. Graetz as stating that complexity in the tax law "is often the result
of overzealous efforts to be fair").
98 See e.g., Gordon D. Henderson, Controlling Hyperlexis-The Most Important 'Law
and...", 43 TAX LAW. 177, 192 & n.49 (1989) (noting that there have been major
revisions in the federal tax law "almost every year in the last decade").
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chooses not to investigate her uncertainties regarding the law's
requirements is fundamentally different from someone who
attempts in good faith to comply fully with the law. Given that the
tax law is by no means "inherently" known, one might safely assume
that such a reckless individual is virtually certain to be in noncom-
pliance with the law. The reckless noncomplier, therefore, is
deliberately failing to satisfy the minimum level of conduct
demanded of all citizens. As such, a reckless noncomplier is
sufficiently culpable to justify criminal sanctions. Considering the
nature of the tax system and the demands it places on citizens for
it to function properly (mainly diligence), there would appear to be
no impropriety in criminally punishing the reckless noncomplier.
III. THE POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY OF EXPANDED LIABILITY
Despite the equitable basis for expanded liability, politicians and
taxpayers alike would not likely be receptive to the expansion of
criminal liability in the abstract. Expanding criminal liability to
force compliance with existing laws would be thought by some to
instill only fear and resentment in the taxpaying public,99 and thus
would not be a good method of encouraging "voluntary" compli-
ance.10 0 But when the proposal is analyzed in the proper context
and framework, its advantages become clear. If these benefits are
stressed, the proposal could easily become acceptable politically.
After all, it is difficult to argue against requiring diligence in tax
compliance. Using contemporary notions of tax policy, democracy,
an enforcement procedure, this Part will evaluate the proposal as a
tax compliance measure and seek to articulate its advantages and
disadvantages.
9 See ABA COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 21 ("Those trying in good faith
to comply may become resentful when they perceive punitive responses to instances
where they misunderstood or misinterpreted the legal requirements.").
100 See id. ("Strict and unreasonable enforcement can, in fact, contribute to
undermining the policy goals which the rules are designed to enforce .... Alienation
and increasing hostility can deprive the agency of cooperation and can increase
enforcement costs."); see also supra note 71.
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A. Expanded Liability as Tax Policy
Under contemporary notions of tax policy, any suggestion to
improve the integrity of the tax compliance system is evaluated by
analyzing the extent to which it furthers five basic goals: (1)
increasing equity; (2) promoting administrative efficiency; (3)
preserving taxpayer privacy interests; (4) maximizing revenue; and
(5) minimizing the compliance burden on taxpayers and third
parties.101 Applying these considerations to the proposal at hand,
it promotes most of them.
The equity factor clearly favors adoption of the proposal.
Generally, theorists consider two types of tax equity: horizontal and
vertical. 10 2 Horizontal equity refers to treating similarly situated
taxpayers alike.10 3 Vertical equity describes the policy of having
high-income taxpayers share a larger portion of the tax burden than
lower-income taxpayers, and it is based largely on notions of "ability
to pay."104  Generally, both types of equity are offended when
taxpayers incorrectly report their tax liabilities, 10 5 and diligence
would appear to have a direct connection to the accuracy of this
reporting. Consider the case of two similarly situated taxpayers,
with one taxpayer being very diligent in the preparation of her
return and the other less so. In our system of taxation, the
outcomes with respect to self-reported taxable income are likely to
be very different. The diligent taxpayer is more likely to state
income correctly while her counterpart either overstates or
understates income. If both taxpayers are equally diligent, however,
theory would suggest that the taxpayers would arrive at more equal
income approximations, thus achieving greater horizontal equi-
ty.
1 0 6
101 See Harris, supra note 2, at 532 (presenting the five criteria); see also John A.
LeDuc, The Legislative Response of the 97th Congress to Tax Shelters, the Audit Lottery, and
Other Forms of Intentional or Reckless Noncompliance, 18 TAX NOTES 363, 365 (1983).
102 For a general discussion of the equity concept and its role in tax policy, see
MICHAELJ. GRAETZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 17-19 (2d
ed. 1988).
103 See Harris, supra note 2, at 532.
104 See LeDuc, supra note 101, at 364. These vertical equity considerations are
seen by some as fundamental to ajust taxing system. See, e.g., RONALD PASQUAR-
IELLO, TAxJUSTICE: SOCIAL AND MORAL ASPECTS OF AMERICAN TAx POLICY 44 (1985)
(stating that, to most people, "tax justice ... means taxing according to ability-to-
pay").
105 See Harris, supra note 2, at 532 (noting that uncorrected errors resulting in an
incorrect statement of a taxpayer's tax liability offends the equity principle).
106 This example assumes that both taxpayers have roughly equal abilities to
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Diligence proves similarly effective in improving vertical equity.
Assume that two taxpayers, one with a large amount of income and
another with less income, each compute their respective tax
liabilities. Under the current somewhat progressive American
income tax system, other things held equal, the high-income
taxpayer should report a greater tax liability than her lower-income
counterpart. If one or both of the taxpayers is reckless in the
preparation of her return, however, the congressional scheme of
progressivity is likely to be frustrated, with one or both of them
overstating or understating income or deductions.
Administrative efficiency considerations also support the
proposal. Administrative efficiency "requires an analysis of whether
the proposed change would lead to more self-reporting without the
use of Service intervention." 10 7 Currently, the compliance system
is enormously over-burdened,108 and revenue authorities have
many more returns flow through the system each year than they can
afford to audit.'0 9 Should the proposal achieve its desired conse-
quences-promoting diligence-it could do much to relieve some of
that burden (at least in the enforcement area). The expansion of
liability, to be effective, may require the Service to conduct more
investigations and, thus, expend more resources in the short-term.
Yet, the proposal could possibly have other consequences. The
expansion of criminal liability could, for example, produce a sense
of anxiety among taxpayers who would perceive themselves to be
subject to a greater threat of criminal prosecution. This anxiety
could force the Service to allocate a greater portion of its resources
to answering the questions of confused taxpayers searching for
solutions to their problems. But over time, this burden would
subside as veteran taxpayers become more comfortable with the tax
law. Moreover, improving compliance through expanded response
to taxpayer questions should be preferred over improving compli-
ance by increasing more expensive and intrusive enforcement
compute their respective tax liabilities.
107 Harris, supra note 2, at 533. This concept of administrative efficiency should
be distinguished from the unrelated concept of efficiency as a goal of tax policy and
legislation. For a discussion of this latter notion, see GRAETZ, supra note 102, at 17.
108 See, e.g., Long & Burnham, supra note 21, at 747 (noting that lack of
enforcement resources constrains the Service's ability to collect taxes).
109 See Harris, supra note 2, at 515 n.3 (citing the Commissioner's and Chief
Counsel's Annual Reports of the Internal Revenue Service, which states that only
1.3% of the total returns filed in 1984 were audited); see also Steuerle, supra note 18,
at 859 (noting that only .8% of individual taxpayers' returns were audited in 1990).
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measures, such as individual audits and the subsequent correction
of errors through amended returns.
Although at first glance the effects on taxpayer privacy interests
may appear to be neutral, over the long term the proposal would do
much to prevent further intrusion into taxpayer privacy. By forcing
taxpayers to be diligent, the proposal would encourage taxpayers to
make the disclosures now required under current law more
accurately, rather than forcing them to make more disclosures. On
a deeper level, however, greater compliance with existing disclosure
requirements may protect against future privacy intrusions. As one
commentator has noted, "[w]ithout much question, the less accurate
the initial self-reporting by taxpayers, the greater the need or
incentive for the Service to inquire further into taxpayer aff-
airs."110 Thus, although the taxpayer would be under a greater
threat of prosecution and public exposure for her lack of diligence,
all things considered, the proposal's effects on privacy would be
favorable.
With regard to the revenue criterion, the effect of the proposal
is difficult to gauge. It is readily admitted that some noncompliance
contained in the tax gap is the result of "taxpayer negligence and
lack of due care."111 It is also admitted, however, that some of
this noncompliance overstates rather than understates taxable
income. 112  Over the long term, the increase in compliance
should bolster revenues by improving general compliance morality,
allowing the revenue system to expand to realize its full potential,
and permitting the Service ultimately to allocate its enforcement
resources more efficiently.
11
And finally, to implement the program fully in the fairest
possible manner, the compliance burden on third parties, as well as
taxpayers, would probably have to be increased. Information
reporting is already becoming a growing part of the compliance
system.114 As an integral part of fairly enforcing the proposed
110 Harris, supra note 2, at 534.
I ABA COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 2.
112 Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, the IRS has determined that, of the
income tax returns not in compliance with the law, 10% reflected overstatements of
income and 90% reflected understatements. See KINSEY, supra note 29, at 1, 4-8 &
tbl. 1; see also SMITH & KINSEY, supra note 79, at 4 (noting that about 8% of taxpayers
overpay unintentionally).
n 3Cf. Steuerle, supra note 18, at 860 (noting that audits are now being replaced
by reporting and withholding mechanisms).
14 See id. at 859-60; see also Long & Burnham, supra note 21, at 744 (discussing
how the Service researches income tax noncompliance).
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expansion, such information reporting would place a greater burden
on third parties to provide data about, and notice to, relevant
taxpayers. But the significance of the incremental burden, in light
of the present tax gap and the existing proposals for expanded
reporting already on the table, appear justified when considered in
light of the potential benefits-more accurate tax returns and a more
compliance-oriented public.
B. Expansion as Democratic Reinforcement
Aside from comporting with contemporary notions of tax policy
or considerations of the compliance system generally, encouraging
taxpayers to search for answers to their tax questions and become
more familiar with the law could have other positive consequences.
One is the improvement and promotion of the democratic pro-
cess.
115
The tax laws are notoriously complex," 6 and' under our
present regime taxpayers have become enormously alienated,
frustrated, and discouraged. 1 7 As a result, large portions of
society are increasingly unfamiliar with the tax laws. The effective
functioning of a representative government, however, is premised
on an informed electorate; that electorate seems virtually nonexist-
ent with respect to the tax laws and tax policy.
Forcing taxpayers to wrestle with the tax laws diligently should
encourage them to acquire a better understanding of the general
structure of the tax law, its strengths and its weaknesses. This
knowledge, in turn, would help the representative bodies of
government respond to taxpayer concerns. Granted, the lag time
before the average taxpayer is capable of making an informed
recommendation concerning tax policy may be lengthy, and it is
safe to assume that only a very few will grasp a full knowledge of the
Code, but in the long term, the effects could be dramatic. The
115 The notion that increased compliance is beneficial to the democratic process
and a democratic society has been accepted by others. See LeDuc, supra note 2, at
1029 n.7 (stating that "compliance with law is a good in any democratic society").
116 See supra note 97.
117 See, e.g., Finagling on Taxes Approaching the Crisis Stage, supra note 97 (noting
that complexity has "sent hordes of taxpayers scurrying to tax-preparation
professionals") (quoting MichaelJ. Graetz); Make Risks High Enough, supra note 6, at
47 (stating that, as a result of the complexity of the system, many taxpayers get
"discouraged" and "they just put anything down on their return and send it in")
(statement of Roscoe L. Egger, Jr., then-Commissioner of Internal Revenue).
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alternative-an increasingly frustrated and disconcerted public-is
certainly less desirable.
C. The Proposal as an Enforcement Mechanism
The concerns most likely to be at the forefront of public
consciousness are the regularity with which the government would
use its new tool and the potential for abuse. However, a few basic
observations should lay this concern to rest.
Historically, the decision to prosecute a tax case has been made
only after a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of
the taxpayer's case. 118  Deterrence is the primary goal: "tax
prosecutions are not undertaken to collect revenue, but rather to
demonstrate to taxpayers generally that tax evasion does not
pay."119 Additionally, as one prosecuting attorney has stated, "the
government takes very few tax disputes to indictment, only those
with which it can send a message." 120 There is nothing to suggest
that this policy would be altered under a recklessness standard. In
fact, for the expansion to have its desired effect, selective prosecu-
tion must be continued.
Traditionally, three factors have produced the extremely low
rate of criminal prosecutions. First, the costs associated with a
criminal investigation and prosecution make it one of the least
efficient methods of realizing revenue on an individual taxpayer
basis. These costs would most likely remain constant, despite an
alteration of the standard of liability. Second, the negative publicity
generated by losing a tax prosecution case would continue to
provide a strong incentive to forego prosecution of questionable
cases. 12 1  So long as the government is perceived as merely
enforcing the laws as necessary to protect the public fisc, and not as
118 See BALTER, supra note 3, at 24-26 (listing the alternative actions that the
government may take in conducting a tax investigation, and concluding that the
decision to prosecute will be made in cases only where there has been "a very careful
inquiry into every phase of the case and after many stages of review"); Richard M.
Roberts, Administrative Processes After Investigation Is Completed, in DEFENDING TAX
FRAUD PROSECUTIONs 63,64-92 (PLI Crim. Law & Urban Probs. Transcript Series No.
2, 1970) (detailing the procedures taken in making the decision to prosecute).
119 Roberts, supra note 118, at 86.
120 Alan Abrahamson, Not EveryoneJust Complains About Taxes, L.A. TIMES (San
Diego County ed.), Aug. 18, 1991, at B, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt
File.
121 See Roberts, supra note 118, at 86 ("'The Government is quite selective in those
it prosecutes.... [W]hen we lose a case the desired deterrent effect is not
produced.'" (quoting a member of the Department ofJustice's Tax Division)).
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"ganging up" on innocent taxpayers, the public will support the
government and its efforts. Once the government crosses this line,
however, it will quickly lose both the respect and cooperation of
taxpayers. Third, and probably most importantly, juries would still
be composed of fellow taxpayers. In the event of an overly zealous
prosecution, jury oversensitivity would be a real consideration.
122
Finally, civil penalties, by providing an intermediate level of
punishment, would play an important role in preventing prosecu-
tions on a wholesale basis.123 Accordingly, it is highly unlikely
that the Service would begin wholesale prosecutions simply because
reckless noncompliance became a crime.
CONCLUSION
In times of drastic budget cuts and growing annual federal
deficits, the problem of noncompliance with the tax laws assumes an
ever-increasing importance. As one expert has expressed his
concern, "[n]ations have declined because they were defeated in
war, lost their economic advantage, or suffered a failure of
leadership. The United States may become the first great power in
history to falter because it lost its ability to collect taxes." 124 The
traditional responses have been largely unable to deal with the
problem, and despite congressional revisions in the civil penalty
structure, 125 the tax gap continues to grow. Answers to a prob-
lem of this magnitude do not come easily, but one thing that
appears obvious is that the response should be extraordinary.
The responsibilities of citizenship include the duty to take the
laws seriously. In the taxation context, this means that one must be
diligent and uphold the public trust by attempting in good faith to
perform duties of self-assessment. Unfortunately, the criminal
provisions of the Code do little to require a taxpayer to make a
good faith effort, and may even create a disincentive for the
taxpayer to do so.
122 This is especially possible with respect to the "due diligence" requirement. See
supra note 82 and accompanying text.
125 See generally SALTZMAN & KAPLAN, supra note 32, 1 1.01, at 1-1 to 1-3
(discussing the general history of civil penalty provisions); see also BALTER, supra note
3, at 25 (discussing the Service's use of civil penalties as an intermediate form of
deterrence and punishment).
124 Hugh Caulkins, Foreword to INCOME TAx COMPLIANCE, supra note 21, at viii.
125 See Dubin et al., supra note 18, at 787-88 (outlining legislation of the 1980s
with regard to civil penalties).
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The criminal provisions of the Code should be expanded to
require diligence in reporting and to demand that the duty of self-
reporting be taken seriously. This expansion should be implement-
ed only as part of an integrated plan involving other mechanisms.
With greater information reporting, increased Service-sponsored
educational programs, and direct appeals to the taxpaying public to
perform their duties diligently, an expansion of criminal liability to
reach "reckless noncompliance" could be implemented in a way that
is fair, systematically compatible, and politically acceptable. The
general public's recognition of that fact could be an important first
step towards improving the noncompliance problem.

